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sheds light on human rights debate

Soon after the United Nations was established, its
Human Rights Commission, under Eleanor Roosevelt, set
about drafting an international bill ofhuman rights.
This soon divided into two different instruments. One
was designed as a declaration or manifesto on human
rights, a statement ofideas; this became the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, which was adopted by the
Genera/Assembly on December 10, 1948.
The other was to be a covenant on human rights.
This was to be a multilateral treaty; unlike the Universal
Declaration, it would actually impose obligations in
international law on whichever states ratified it.
Drafting the declaration took two years, drafting the
eovenant took nearly 20, and what was settled in 1966
, was two covenants, not just one.
I have been working on a book dealing primarily
with the negotiations in the Council ofEurope, which
produeed the European Convention on Human Rights.
'fbjs was signed in 1"50; a protocol signed in 1952 dealt
with some rjghis, which had been left out ofthe basic
cOV,efla1tt oJ1!J50. The United-Nations negotiations were
dosely conflfJ.ctift!, S(!) far as Britain was concerned, with
the European negoJiations,,Indeed, Britain tried and
klrgely succeeiJe1 inJ>roducingfor Europe the sort of
covenant it had beert trying to p,:omote, Without much
success, in the United Na#Qizs. So I ~ been W()Tking
through not
.. only the archives ofthe British Foreign
Office, but also tbos_e ofthe United R(ltions and the
U.S. State Dep4rtment.
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The British Foreig.n Office archives for this period
are now nearly al/, open and {JIJ(J/kJ,ble to researchers

in the British Public Record-Office near Kew Gardens
in London. When /./was working there some months
ago, I was reading a file that contained a minute ofd
meeting that took place in the Foreign Office on
February 24, 1950. It was written bj one Martin J:e
Quesne, a British diplomat who today live.s in
retirement in Jersey. At this time be was our man on
human rights. It began:
·
''Miss Willis ofthe American Embassy brought~
Mr. Stein, a klwyer from the Department ofJustice
in Washington, to see Mr. Vincent Evans and myself
yesterday about Article 2 ofthe Covenant of
Human Rights."
Evans I knew - he later became a judge ofthe
European Court ofHuman Rights, and had given me
help in my research. But who was Stein? For a
moment I did not grasp what was happening;
suddenly realization dawned, and, to the intense
irritation ofother researchers, not to mention
disapproving archivists, I call out aloud:
"That's Eric!"
It was indeed I had met my colleague, Professor
Emeritus Eric Stein, '42, lurking in the British
archives. One does not often meet a colleague in this
curious way.
Continued on page 85
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A
t the time, the British and
the Americans were locked in
mortal combat over the United
Nations Covenant; they were able
to agree on very little.
Negotiations in the Human Rights
Commission were difficult for various
reasons - one was the aggressive behavior
of the Soviet representatives, particularly
one Pavlov, nephew of "dogs" Pavlov, who
never missed an opportunity to rail against
the iniquities of the West. One might have
expected, however, that the British and the
Americans, both of whom claim to have
invented human rights, as of course do the
French, would have been able to see eye
to eye.
But this was not so.
The British wanted the covenant to
contain a provision whereby a state, which
acceded, had to bring its laws into
conformity before accession. The
Americans objected, and wanted the
covenant merely to require conformity
within a reasonable time, with reports of
progress. The British argued that this
would enable a state to sign up whilst
having no intention of ever bringing its law
into line. It took years, they pointed out,
for the United States to conform to the
Convention on Migratory Birds, which at
this time were not thought to have any
rights, however kindly disposed one was to
them; how much worse if humans, who
did have rights, were involved.
The Americans, through the State
Department, thought that it would be quite
impossible for the U.S. executive to secure
the passage of the necessary laws before
ratification. Indeed, if the provision the
British wanted was included, the Senate
might well refuse to provide the advice and
consent required by the Constitution
before the president could ratify the
convention. Lurking behind the
disagreement were sensitivities over the use
of the treaty-making power to trench on
"states' rights," together with the existence
in some of the southern states of legal

provisions quite certain to fall afoul of any
convenant that was likely to emerge from
the United Nations. The meeting recorded
in the minute was mainly designed to
produce a compromise on this thorny
issue, over which both sides had dug in
their toes.
Another ongoing disagreement, also
discussed at the same and other meetings,
arose over limitations to rights. The British
wanted these to be spelled out very
specifically for each right; the State
Department favored a general limitations
clause, which would apply to all rights.
The British argued that such a general
clause would weaken the convention;
indeed, it would enable naughty states in particular the demonized Soviets - to
sign up to the convention, acquire brownie
points as protectors of human rights, and
then continue to oppress their subjects
more or less as much as they liked. The
U.S. position was that it was impossible to
spell out all limitations in advance; the
problem should be handled by the use of
general language. Any other solution would
immensely complicate the process of
drafting, and be impractical. If conformity
before accession were insisted upon as
well, the limitations would have to
conform in detail with the law of all states
that acceded, a fanciful notion. The British
were unimpressed. Given the will, the job
could be done.
More radically, the British officials
adopted a somewhat holier than thou
attitude, taking the line that the State
Department was being hypocritical. All it
wanted was a covenant so vacuous as to be
acceptable to the Senate and one that
would make no practical difference to life
in the United States, or indeed anywhere
else. The sort of covenant the Senate would
accept would hardly be worth the paper it
was written on. State Department officials
were, however, not just being hypocritical;
they were naturally affected by the political
realities of the situation. They did not want
to engage in negotiating a covenant that
they could not hope to sell to the Senate.
There were at this time other disputes
that divided the British and the Americans.
The British wanted a special provision
allowing, but not requiring, extension of

the covenant to colonies; the Americans
wanted a special provision to deal with the
tricky relationship between the federal
authorities and the state;;. Here one could
be horse traded for the other, but
conformity before accession was not
viewed as tradable.
After the meeting with Stein, senior
officials in the Foreign Office - William
Strang, the official head; Eric Beckett, the
legal adviser; and Gladyn Jebb, whose
daughter Stella I rather fancied as a student
at Oxford, albeit with no success - met to
consider whether it was prudent to
squabble with the United States on this
issue. The decision was not to change
position. Beckett, an international lawyer of
considerable ability, was adamant on this,
flexibility not being his strong point.
Later, I was working in the U.S.
National Archives on the records of the
State Department. These are, for this
period, much less voluminous than are the
British archives, and less complete; the
finding aids provided are pretty bad. I was
therefore both surprised and delighted to
locate an account of the selfsame meeting,
telegraphed from the U.S. Embassy in
London to the State Department. For a
second time I met Eric in the archives.
But there was a problem. Whereas the
British account gives the impression that
the British won the argument, the
American account strongly gives the
contrary impression. Thus, the British
account sets out what reads like a crushing
response to the argument that the U.S.
public was enthusiastic in its support of the
convenant, and that the British should
assist the administration in its attempts to
secure the necessary legislation by not
insisting on strict conformity on accession:
That if the American public was so
enthusiastic for the covenant, it was strange
that Congress should be untouched by this
enthusiasm.
Continued on page 86
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Game set and match to the Foreign
Office. The American telegram, however,
states that:
"... both Lequesne and Ellis [really
Evans] appeared impressed by U.S.
arguments though unable give immediate
answer possible modification UK position."
Perhaps Henry Ford was right after all,
and all history really is bunk. Be that as it
may, the Americans ultimately won the
battle in the United Nations, for the
covenants of 1966 do not require states to
bring their law into conformity before
accession. And, as it turned out, the United
States took until 1992 to ratify the United
Nations Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and then only did so with a
package of reservations and understandings
that had the practical effect of depriving
ratification of any domestic impact. Given
the politics, this was the best that could be
done. So the problems to which Stein
called attention in 1950 were all too real.
As for the British, they stuck to their
view in the European negotiations until
shortly before signature, but then began to
run into problems not unlike those that
had motivated the State Department. Some
European countries could not conform to
the convention without amending their
constitutions; the Norwegian constitution
provided, for example, that "Jesuits shall
not be tolerated."
This hardly conformed to the provision
on religious liberty So, late in the day, the
British delegate changed position on the
issue, and supported a provision that
allowed ratification with reservations; this
was to cover non-conforming laws. Britain
itself ratified the convention without
reservations, but slyly adopted, without
publicizing this, a policy of substantial
compliance only. In due course, however,
recognition under the European
Convention of a right of individual
petition, and the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Human Rights, has
produced a situation in which nonconforming laws can be effectively
challenged, and many British legal
provisions have had to be changed in order
to bring domestic law into line.
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A
t the time of this writing, the convention is being la,gdy incmpornted into
British domestic law, and there have been some expressions of alarm in legal circles,
similar to those that have caused problems in the United States. One Scottish Judge, Lord
Mcluskey, has recently described the convention in such hostile terms - "a field day for
crackpots, a pain in the neck for judges and legislators, and a goldmine for lawyers" that he can no longer sit in any case that might involve human rights, which promises to
provide him with a life of unbounded leisure in his remaining years on the bench. There
is, everywhere, a tendency to think of human rights as being primarily for export only
PHOTO BY SUSANA BYERS

Professors Stein, left, and Simpson don't spend all
their time in the archives. Here they help the Law
School host a gala dinner for members of The
European Court ofJustice and the U.S. Supreme
Court in Washington, D.C., in April.

Professor Eric Stein adds:
'1 hat;I completelyforgotwn the London
eting upl'il Brian, the premiere archive
sleuth, re.freshed;,my memory. Aotitally, my
regular assignmen in the State Department
concernedpolitical and s«;urlty affairs ofthe,·
United Nations - I had nothing to do with the
human rights project, which in my office was
considered rather 'intangib 'and elusive.'
"While stopping in London, on the way to
the International Court ofJustice at J'he Hague
(I believe), I received instruction from
Washington to see the Foreign Office and
present the line ofargument described so vividly
by Brian. I did so, and thought I did my best,
considering my limited knowledge ofthe issues.
I thought, as I recall it, that my presentation
made some impression on the British, and I
included a paragraph to that effect in my cabk
to Washington.
"Yet, Brian reports, I pretty much lost
the battle, hut in the end the United States
won the war."

